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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMPULSORY MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR AN
ADULT-THE RIGHT OF AN ADULT TO REFUSE LIFESAVING MEDICAL
TREATMENT BASED UPON THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT-The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that an
adult, whose religious beliefs forbid blood transfusions but who risks
death if a transfusion is not given, may be compelled to submit to such
treatment.
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670 (1971).
Delores Heston, a twenty-two year-old, single female, was severely
injured in an automobile accident. She was taken to the plaintiff hos-
pital where her injury was diagnosed as a ruptured spleen, necessitating
surgery and a blood transfusion to save her life. Miss Heston and her
parents were Jehovah's Witnesses and a tenet of their faith forbids
blood transfusions.' The evidence indicates that Miss Heston was in
shock when admitted to the hospital, and shortly thereafter became
incoherent and lost consciousness, although she insisted that she ex-
pressed her refusal to accept a blood transfusion. The patient's mother
1. The basis for the Jehovah's Witnesses belief was expounded in In re Brooks' Es-
tate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965):
Among the religious beliefs adhered to by members of this group is the principle
that blood transfusions are a violation of the law of God, and that transgressors will
be punished by God. This organization's publication, "Blood, Medicine and the Law
of God .. .states the principle: "The matter was not to be taken lightly. Any vio-
lation of the law on blood was a serious sin against God, and God himself would
call the violator to account. 'As for any man of the house of Israel or some alien
resident who is residing as an alien in your midst who eats any sort of blood, I shall
certainly set my face against the soul that is eating the blood, and I shall indeed
cut him off from among his peopleI.-Leviticus 17:10". Also a part of the foundation
for this belief is the admonition found in the book of the Apostles, 15:28-29: "For it
seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden than
these necessary things; that ye abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood,
and from things strangled, and from fornication; from which if ye keep yourselves,
ye shall do well". Various other Biblical texts are quoted as authority for the belief,
including Genesis 9:3-4: "Every moving animal that is alive may serve as food for
you. As in the case of green vegetation, I do give it all to you. Only flesh with its
soul-its blood-you must not eat". Premised upon the belief that "The blood is
the soul" (Deuteronomy 12:33) and that "We cannot drain from our body part of
that blood, which represents our life, and still love God with our whole soul, because
we have taken away part of 'our soul-our blood-' and given it to someone else"
(Blood, Medicine and the Law of God, p. 8), members of Jehovah's Witnesses regard
themselves commanded by God to neither give nor receive transfusions of blood.
Id. at 362-63, 205 N.E.2d at 436-37.
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signed a release of civil liability for the hospital but fervently refused
to sanction the blood transfusion.2
Death being imminent, the hospital, after notifying the mother,
applied to a judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey seeking the ap-
pointment of a guardian capable of authorizing a transfusion of whole
blood for the injured woman. The judge approved the hospital's re-
quest, thereby permitting the surgery and blood transfusion that saved
the young woman's life. The defendants, Miss Heston and her mother,
moved to vacate the superior court's order; but their motion was denied.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower court's decision,3
holding that "the interest of the hospital and its staff, as well as the
state's interest in life warranted the transfusion of blood under the cir-
cumstances of this case." 4
The courts that have been confronted with the issue of compulsory
medical treatment for an adult have encountered complex constitu-
tional issues stemming from the direct conflict between the patient's
constitutionally guaranteed rights of privacy5 and freedom to exercise
his religion, 6 and the government's interest in compelling such treat-
ment. It is within these conflicting concepts that the courts must work
in order to evolve a legal standard in the delicate area of compulsory
medical treatment.
The first amendment guarantees, which insure the ability of indi-
viduals to exercise their religion, does not confer an absolute right. As
early as 1878, the Supreme Court held that laws are made for the gov-
ernment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinion, they may interfere with practices. 7 Hence, the
Court has upheld government regulation of overt acts because the free-
dom to act, even when the action is in accord with one's religious con-
2. At common law the rule was formulated that an operation by a physician without
the consent of the patient or someone authorized to speak for him constituted a battery
or trespass upon the patient for which the physician was liable in damages. See Schloen-
dorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
3. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 579, 279 A.2d 670, 671
(1971). Since the issue was moot, the Supreme Court of New Jersey asserted that the
public interest warranted a resolution of the controversy. See State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.
463, 469, 181 A.2d 751, 755, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
4. 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
5. The right of privacy was held to exist not from any specific guarantee of the Bill
of Rights, but from a "penumbra" of several of the amendments. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). The fourteenth amendment makes this provision applicable to the
states. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or the free
exercise thereof .... U.S. CONsT. amend. I (emphasis added).
7. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
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victions, is not completely free from legislative restrictions.8 But, before
state encroachment upon an individual's first amendment right to prac-
tice his religion may be justified, a compelling state interest9 must be
demonstrated. Therefore, laws restricting religious acts that have a pro-
pensity to harm the safety,10 morals," health,12 or general welfare' 8 of
the community are not repugnant to constitutional guarantees of reli-
gious freedom because a compelling state interest exists to justify state
intervention.
Additionally significant for consideration within the area of individ-
ual rights is the assertion of Mr. Justice Brandeis that all Americans
have the right to be "let alone."' 4 This right of privacy extends to citi-
zens because no injury to society or third persons is sustained; but dilu-
tion of the right becomes sanctionable when the citizen asserts the right
beyond personal limits.
The blood transfusion cases arose against the background of the first
amendment's religious exercise provisions, and the accepted concept
of individual privacy, absent extenuating harm to society or third per-
sons. Patients espousing religious objections to transfusions seized upon
the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis and vigorously disclaimed harm to
anyone but themselves. The state, asserting a harm to society, claimed
8. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1963). See also Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584 (1942):
Courts, no more than Constitutions, can intrude into the consciences of men or com-
pel them to believe contrary to their faith or think contrary to their convictions; but
courts are competent to adjudge the acts men do under color of a constitutional right,
such as that of freedom of speech or of the press or the free exercise of religion, and
to determine whether the claimed right is limited by other recognized powers equally
precious to mankind. So the mind and spirit of man remain forever free, while his
actions rest subject to necessary accommodations to the competing needs of his fel-
lows".
Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added).
9. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regu-
late can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
10. "Protection of the safety of persons is one of the traditional uses of the police
power of the state." Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 82 (1946).
11. "The rule is well settled that the police power may be exerted to preserve and
protect the public morals." State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 425, 11 A.2d 856, 862 (1940).
12. "It is recognized without exception that the police power of a state extends to the
right to regulate trades and callings concerning public health." Polhemus v. American
Medical Ass'n, 145 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1947).
13. East N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945).
14. The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their be-
liefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
rights most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intru-
sion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em.
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
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that an interest is possessed by society in the lives of its citizens and
that, accordingly, blood transfusions can be compelled. Because of the
direct disagreement between the two averments, the courts have en-
countered complex constitutional issues when patients, basing their
decision on religious beliefs, have refused to consent to blood trans-
fusions necessary to sustain their lives.
Most courts, intentionally avoiding confrontation with the issue,
have supported the resolution of the controversy by finding distinguish-
ing factors. Parens patriael5 and the state police power have been up-
held as state interests sufficient to warrant state interference with
religious practices. State regulation of snakehandling, 6 compulsory
education,1 7 the unlicensed practice of medicine,1 8 and compulsory vac-
cination for contagious diseases,' 9 are but a few examples of religious
objections having been suppressed under the sanctions of the state po-
lice power. In addition, parens patriae has enabled the state to compel
treatment for children 20 or incompetents2a over the religious objections
of their parents.
Excluding Heston, five courts have specifically addressed themselves
to situations where adults have refused blood transfusions rather than
sacrifice religious beliefs. Four of these courts have permitted the trans-
fusions over the patient's objections; but, the issue of compulsory medi-
cal treatment for an adult was avoided as the courts found factual
distinctions to support the transfusions. 2 1
Sustaining a request for a transfusion, a single judge of the United
15. Parens patriae is defined:
In the United States, the state, as sovereign power of guardianship over persons un-
der disability; such as minors, and insane and incompetent persons.
BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1951).
16. Bunn v. North Carolina, 366 U.S. 942 (1949); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky.
437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
17. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being the state as parens
patriae may restrict the parents control by requiring school attendance ...
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
18. The power of a State to make reasonable provisions for determining the quali-
fications of those engaging in the practice of medicine and punishing those who at-
tempt to engage therein in defiance of such statutory provisions, is not open to
question.
Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 506 (1903).
19. Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (Super. Ct. 1959).
20. "The state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority
in things affecting the child's welfare. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167
(1944).
21. But the power and duty imposed by the parens patriae doctrine is much broader
and extends to personal liberty of persons who are under a disability whether by
reason of infancy, incompetence, habitual drunkenness, imbecility. ...
Johnston v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 430, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955).
22. A detailed distinction of these cases on the facts is beyond the scope of this paper.
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States District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia authorized
a transfusion for the mother of an infant in Application of President
& Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.23 The court felt the patient
was in extremis and hardly compos mentis, and hence, incompetent to
decide the proper course of action to be taken. In conjunction with
this determination, the court relied on the state's parens patriae inter-
est to prevent the abandonment of children. It was also noted that the
doctors and the hospital are placed in a precarious position when the
patient imposes such a restriction; but, the judge concluded that "[t]he
final and compelling reason for the granting of the emergency writ was
that a life hung in the balance . . . I determined to act on the side of
life. 2 4 Relying on Georgetown, the court in United States v. George25
authorized a transfusion after speaking with the patient at the hospi-
tal. The court ascertained that the patient would not oppose a court
ordered transfusion because " 'his conscience was clear', and the respon-
sibility for the act was 'upon the conscience of the court'."26 Consid-
erable emphasis was placed upon the doctor's conscience and
professional oath.27
In Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,28 the court au-
thorized a transfusion after learning that the patient would not object
to a court-ordered transfusion. The decision apparently was based on
the judge's personal response to the situation rather than on any pro-
nounced theory of law.2 9
A New Jersey court in Raleigh-Fitkin Paul Morgan Memorial Hos-
pital v. Anderson80 employed parens patriae to authorize a transfusion
for an expectant mother over her religious protests in order to sustain
the life of her unborn child. The court recognized the difficult ques-
tion of compulsory treatment for an adult, but postponed the resolu-
tion of that issue.8 1
23. 31 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 US. 978 (1965).
24. Id. at 1009-10.
25. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
26. Id. at 753.
27. Id. at 754.
28. 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
29. How legalistic minded our society has become, and what an ultra-legalistic maze
we have created to the extent that society and the individual have become enmeshed
and paralyzed by its unrealistic entanglementsl I was reminded of "The Fall" by
Camus, and I knew that no release-no legalistic absolution-would absolve me or
the Court from responsibility if I, speaking for the Court, answered "No" to the
question "Am I my brother's keeper?" This woman wanted to live. I could not let
her die!
Id. at 216, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
30. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
31. We have no difficulty in so deciding with respect to the infant child. The more
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Two courts have refused to order transfusions. The court in Erick-
son v. Dilgard2 faced a patient who expressed a willingness to submit
to an operation to correct internal bleeding, but was adamant in his
refusal of a blood transfusion.8 8 The patient was completely informed
of the increased risk of the operation without the transfusion. The
court held that,
the individual who is the subject of a medical decision has the final
say and that must necessarily be so in a system of government which
gives the greatest possible protection to the individual in the fur-
therance of his own desires.3 4
A similar negative response was elicited from the reviewing court in
In re Estate of Brooks"5 after the trial court had allowed the transfu-
sion. The patient did not have minor children and had informed her
physician over the course of the two preceding years that her religious
beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness precluded her acceptance of a blood
transfusion. The patient and her husband signed a release of civil lia-
bility for the hospital and were assured that there would be no further
attempts to persuade her to accept a transfusion. She was unquestion-
ably competent, so the common law grounds such as parens patriae and
abandonment were not available to the court. Meeting the compulsory
medical treatment issue squarely, the reviewing court found no clear
or present danger to society,3 6 and, therefore, expunged all orders in
the conservatorship proceeding.
Prior to the evolvement of the first blood transfusion cases, dicta 7
difficult question is whether an adult may be compelled to submit' to such medical
procedures when necessary to save his life. Here we think it is unnecessary to decide
that question in broad terms because the welfare of the child and the mother are so
intertwined ....
Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
32. 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
33. The patient in Erickson did not refuse to be transfused on religious grounds. He
simply refused to give consent to the transfusion. Id. at 27-28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
34. Id. at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
35. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
36. Id. at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
37. Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determina-
tion. It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he
may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving sur-
gery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or
form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to sub-
stitute his own judgment for that of the patient ....
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-07, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960);
An adult person, if he be of sound mind, is considered to have the right to deter-
mine for himself whether a recommended treatment or surgery shall be performed
upon him, and to have the right even to expressly prohibit life-saving surgery or
other medical treatment.
Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962);
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in several cases seemingly established the unqualified right of an adult
to refuse life-saving medical treatment and to conduct himself as he
pleased, provided that he injured no third person or society. A cursory
examination, however, of the early blood transfusion cases demon-
strates the reluctance of the courts to accept this early dicta. Only the
Brooks court squarely addressed the issue of compulsory blood trans-
fusions for an adult on the merits, while the remainder of the courts
found factual distinctions. It is interesting that both the Heston court
and the Brooks court sought to balance the interest of the patient
against the interests of society; yet they achieved opposite results. The
courts parted company because the Heston court found an injury to
society whereas the Brooks court did not. An analysis of the factors that
distinguish the two cases aids in understanding where the law has been
and where it appears to be going.
There are several factors that distinguish Brooks from Heston al-
though both courts isolated the same issue. The Brooks court employed
the clear and present danger test developed in the freedom of speech
cases, an application of clear and present danger which has been sub-
jected to serious criticism when applied to religious rights.3 8 The mod-
ern test evolved in Sherbert v. Verner,3 9 where the Court recognized
that indirect burdens on religious freedom can be justified by a com-
pelling state interest in the regulation of a subject which is within the
state's constitutional power to regulate.40 The significant difference be-
tween the two tests is that there may be a compelling state interest that
could be protected under the Sherbert test, although there is no threat
to the public health, safety or welfare, and absent such a threat, there
is no justifiable basis upon which the clear and present danger test
used in Brooks could be sustained.
A second distinguishing factor results from the repeated refusals to
be transfused by the patient in Brooks, which preceded her admission
to the hospital by two years and continued after she was admitted,
while the patient in Heston was an emergency patient who was thrust
upon the hospital as a result of the injuries sustained in an automobile
accident. Looking to the dilemma of the doctors, the Heston court
found that the doctors are forced to make a judgment: "[T]he hospital
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body ....
Schloendorff v. society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
38. See 44 TEXAs L. REv. 190 (1965) for an excellent discussion of this concept.
39. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
40. Id.; see note 9 supra.
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could hardly avoid the problem by compelling the removal of a dying
patient . . . . -41 The doctor who administers a blood transfusion over
the objection of the patient would subject himself to a battery prosecu-
tion,42 whereas the doctor who honors the patient's religious abstention
and passively permits the patient to die, may breach a duty owed to
the patient and subject himself to a criminal prosecution for man-
slaughter.48 Of interest is Collins v. Davis,44 a case involving a comatose
patient whose wife refused to consent to a transfusion. The court, re-
fusing to allow the patient and his wife to put the hospital to the im-
possible choice of performing the operation or letting the patient die
for want of consent, authorized the transfusion. 45 The Heston court
also implied that the doctor's conscience and professional ethics 46 may
sway him to transfuse the patient despite the lack of consent.
Considering the number of Jehovah's Witnesses47 and other denomi-
nations whose religious beliefs do not permit certain forms of medical
treatment, it is very likely that compulsory medical treatment will be
an issue to be reconciled by courts in the future. It is suggested that
there are state interests that effectively counterbalance the right of pa-
tients to refuse medical treatment.
Although not concerned with blood transfusions, the court in State
v. Congdon48 convicted several individuals for failure to take cover dur-
ing an air raid drill. The court by so deciding, effectively upheld the
state's police power to protect citizens irrespective of whether the citi-
zen wishes to be protected. 49 In Harden v. State," the Tennessee Su-
41. 58 N.J. at 582-83, 279 A.2d at 673.
42. See note 2 supra.
43. Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); State v. Malley, 139 Mont.
599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961).
44. 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
45. Id. at 623, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
46. Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 IND.
L.J. 386 (1966):
The Hippocratic Oath requires that a physician "give no deadly medicine to anyone
if asked, nor suggest any such counsel." MALOY, MEDICAL DICrIONARY FOR LAWYERS 372
(3d ed. 1960). Similarly, the International Code of Ethics, adopted by the World
Medical Association in Geneva in 1949, states that a "doctor shall not in any cir-
cumstances do, or authorize to be done, or condone anything that would weaken the
physical or mental resistance of a human being, except for the prevention and treat-
ment of disease .... A doctor must always bear in mind the importance of preserv-
ing human life from the time of conception until death." HADFIELD, LAw AND ETHICS
FOP DOCTORS 41, (1958) ....
Id. at 402 n.97.
47. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971 42
(92d ed. 1971), reports that there are 359,000 Jehovah's Witnesses in the United States.
48. 76 N.J. Super. 493, 185 A.2d 21 (Super. Ct. 1963).
49. Id. at 511-12, 185 A.2d at 31.
50. 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
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preme Court's decision exemplified the state's interest in the life of the
citizen through its ruling concerning the handling of poisonous snakes
in religious rituals. Despite precautions to protect observers, the court
found that such precautions do not protect those who are actually han-
dling poisonous snakes.51 It is proper to recognize these precedents
within the area of compulsory medical treatment since the state's in-
terest in life is equally applicable within both realms.
The analogies between suicide and the rejection of lifesaving medi-
cal treatment have been rejected by most courts premised upon the
distinction that death is an unwanted side effect52 since there is no in-
tent to die.53 But regardless of the semantic arguments that may be
made concerning intent, the prohibitions against suicide do, indeed,
reflect the interest of society in the lives of its citizens, and it would ap-
pear to be circular logic which would permit a patient to reject his
last chance of survival when he wanted to live, yet restrain or punish
those who intend to die.54 Turning to the issue of intent, it has been
argued that
[A]lthough the adherents of this religion might not technically
"wish to die" in the literal sense, they do refuse medical treatment
which they know will prevent death, and implicit in that refusal
is a willingness to die.55
One authore 6 has argued that parens patriae should be extended to
protect adults, as well as children or incompetents, from unwise deci-
sions. He cites state refusal to enforce contracts that unduly restrict
future business activities, laws against dueling, compulsory social se-
curity savings, safety statutes requiring the wearing of seat belts by
51. Id. at 24, 216 S.W.2d at 710. See also Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164
S.W.2d 972 (1942). The court forbade snake handling ceremonies, holding that it was
constitutional to enforce a "law prohibiting the practice of a religious rite which en-
dangers the lives, health or safety of the participants . Id. at 441-42, 164 S.W.2d at
974.
52. "Death, to Mrs. Jones, was not a religiously commanded goal, but an unwanted
side effect of a religious scruple." Application of President & Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
53. "The Gordian knot of this suicide question may be cut by the simple fact that
Mrs. Jones did not want to die." Id. at 1009.
54. An outstanding argument was made in 53 CAL. L. REv. 860 (1965) that illustrates
the problem in dealing with the 'intent' to die:
Take, for example, two hospital patients both in dire need of blood transfusions.
One rejects them because of a desire to die, the other because of religious convic-
tions. Should the law allow the patient wishing to live but preferring death to breach
of religious faith, to die, while forcing the one wishing to die, to live? To ask the
question is to answer it.
Id. at 871.
55. 7 HOUSTON L. Rav. 662, 664-65 (1970).
56. See 42 IND. L.J. 386 (1967).
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motorists, and protective headgear for cyclists as examples of state in-
tervention to protect an adult from his own foolishness. 57 Apart from
the parens patriae argument, the examples cited are excellent illustra-
tions of the state's interest in the lives of its citizens.
Those cases that have established the right of the individual to de-
termine what shall be done with his body" have approached the issue
in cases dealing with children. Although transfusions invariably have
been upheld to sustain a child's life, the courts have constructed a wall
of dicta around the adult who falls within the same category. 59 Now
that courts are being forced to confront the compulsory medical treat-
ment issue when refusals are asserted by adults, without the benefit of
children to be used as a distinguishing device, courts seem unwilling to
accept the dicta as binding precedent. Yet, they remain hesitant to dis-
agree directly. Hopefully, courts that assay this problem in the future
will begin to rebuild the law by specifically holding that a strong state
interest exists to compel treatment for an adult, as well as for children.
In addition to the state's interest in life, the position of the hospital
must be considered a viable state interest. An individual who comes to
a hospital for treatment, but refuses to accept elementary medical pro-
cedures, jeopardizes not only his own safety, but also the safety of
other patients. Society suffers when doctors are precluded from prac-
ticing basic medical procedures because the physician's valuable time
which could be devoted to the other patients is focused on the indi-
vidual who seems destined to expire.
The predicament of the medical profession is illustrated by cases
where the life or death decision was thrust upon judges. Even impar-
tial judges isolated from the physical presence of the dying patient,
have determined to "act on the side of life."'60 Considering the diffi-
culty judges have encountered in making such a decision, the arduous
position of the doctor, who knows that a simple blood transfusion
would save his patient's life, becomes more vexatious. The sincerity of
a patient's religious belief which mandates death as the fruit of com-
pliance must be afforded the highest degree of respect. But it is un-
57. Id. at 397-98.
58. See note 37 supra.
59. "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
60. Several courts have specifically decided to act on the side of life. See Application
of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1010 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn.
1965); Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d
450, 451-52 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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conscionable to force a doctor to make a life or death decision by
permitting a patient to place the doctor in the precarious position
where he must decide to transfuse or allow the patient to die. Although
a patient's belief of such magnitude should not be hastily appropriated,
it is felt that the rights of the individual are outbalanced by the inter-
ests of the state and the medical profession. Therefore, the rights of the
individual should succumb to the state's interest in preserving life, in
a life or death situation.
The Heston court's holding, enabling the state to compel transfu-
sion to prevent permanent injury,61 appears to be a premature exten-
sion of the state's interest in compelling medical treatment. The
problem emanates from the unpredictable nature of the permanent in-
jury concept, and the present inability to balance individual rights
against the state's interest in preventing permanent injury. Two pres-
ent practices that may raise conflicts between the state's interest in
preventing permanent injury and the individual's right to exercise her
religion are abortion and birth control. A woman religiously precluded
from practicing birth control or receiving an abortion might be com-
pelled to receive such treatment if the risks of permanent injury to
either herself or the child are sufficient to warrant state interference.
Unlike a life or death situation, balancing the rights of the individ-
ual against the state's interest in preventing permanent injury seems
to be an exceedingly difficult equation to reconcile at the present stage
of legal evolution. Life is a sanctity in which the state has a demon-
strated interest; but, the extremes to which compulsory treatment to
prevent permanent injury may be carried remain ambiguous.
Unfortunately, predisposition governs in this area of the law, so that
a comparison may be drawn to such other unresolvable controversies
as abortion, euthanasia, and birth control. Individual conceptions of
inherent values govern the weight to be afforded the elements of con-
tention in such a controversy, therefore equally strong arguments avail
themselves to individuals who assign the values differently. With re-
spect for individual differences of opinion, it is suggested that the
61. The permanent injury concept is reported only in the headnotes of the New Jersey
and Atlantic reporters:
An adult, whose religious beliefs forbade blood transfusions but who risks death or
permanent injury if transfusion is not given, may be compelled to submit to such
treatment.
58 N.J. at 578, 279 A.2d at 670 (emphasis added). No authority can be found within the
case itself to support state interference to prevent permanent injury.
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state's interest in life and the interest of the hospital and its staff out-
weigh the religiously motivated refusal of the patient to accept a blood
transfusion. Constitutional rights do not exist in a vacuum-clashes
between separate constitutional principles are unavoidable. However,
the balance struck by the Heston court reflects a humane step that the
courts have seemed intuitively led to take.
W. Robert Ament
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-REGULATORY INSPEC-
TIONS-The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a war-
rantless search and seizure, if authorized by a valid inspection statute
limited in scope, time, and place, does not violate fourth amendment
principles.
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
Biswell, a pawnshop owner, was convicted in federal district court for
violating firearms laws. His contention, throughout his trial and appeal,
was that the Gun Control Act of 1968,1 as it applied to him, was uncon-
stitutional. He based his argument on two beliefs. First, the apparent
authorization to search, as contained in the Act,2 was invalid without a
warrant. Second, since such authorization was invalid, any subsequent
acquiescence in a search could not be deemed voluntary. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sustained both of Biswell's contentions.3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari4 to consider the allegations of
the U.S. Attorney's office that the authorization to search was valid. In
the alternative, the government argued that Biswell consented to a
search of his storeroom.
Accepting the government's argument, thereby reversing the court
of appeals, the Supreme Court held that consent is not an issue where
1. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1970) provides, in part:
The Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (including places of
storage) of any firearms . . . dealer . . . for the purpose of inspecting or examining
(1) any records or documents required to be kept by such . . . dealer . . . under
the provisions of this chapter, and (2) any firearms . . . kept or stored by such . . .
dealer . . . at such premises.
2. Id.
3. United States v. Biswell, 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971). The opinion of the court
was written by Clark, J., Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, retired, sitting by
designation.
4. 404 U.S. 983 (1971).
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